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the altruistic. The saving of the soul is achieved only by its emancipation from the corrupting effects of sin, by cultivating all the virtues, altruistic and egoistic alike (pp. 130 ff.).

Modern ethical theory may use somewhat different language from this but its meaning will be much the same. If the principle underlying Christian morality harmonizes with the principle underlying morality in general, there can be no essential difference between the results of Christian ethics and those of secular ethics. And there is no reason why the ideal expressed in the moral teachings of Christianity should be something absolutely unique, if Christian morality is one of the stages in the evolution of morality, as Professor Murray properly conceives it. The book is a sensible presentation of the subject. It is well written and well arranged, and will be of great service to the student and general reader desiring an introduction to the study of Christian ethics.

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The Philosophy of Gassendi. By G. S. BRETT, London, Macmillan and Co., 1908. — pp. xiv, 310.

To most students of philosophy Gassendi's name stands for little more than opposition to Descartes and advocacy of a materialism of the Epicurean type. According to Professor Brett this involves at once a lack of proper appreciation of Gassendi's value and a misinterpretation of his system. *The Philosophy of Gassendi* is intended to rectify both these errors, and since both alike have their source in ignorance of Gassendi's teachings, the greater part of the book is devoted to a summary of the latter. After an introduction containing a history of the line of philosophic thought which terminates in Gassendi, the exposition proper begins with an account of Gassendi's Logic. Here the general standpoint is found to be atomistic, inasmuch as truth and knowledge are regarded as made up of indivisible parts. Gassendi follows Epicurus as to his main outline, but by no means slavishly, and with the addition of elements essentially Aristotelian. He shows here as elsewhere his characteristic breadth of view, boundless learning, and the healthy common sense which refuses to sacrifice facts in the interests of a theoretical unity, no matter how desirable in itself the latter may be; but his most important doctrines are to be sought under the heading of Physics.

A preliminary distinction is that between Nature and God. Nature has both a passive and an active aspect, but the latter is no less dis-

tinct from God than the former. Space and time are defined as quantitative realities independent of matter. The discussion of them as such is described as most "subtle and involved," and its inconsistencies are traced to a confusion between space and time as they are in themselves and as they are in experience. Gassendi constantly shows a rationalistic tendency and just as constantly refuses to follow where it would lead him. His account of his materialistic principle is more consistent. Since the ultimate matter must be really ultimate and also capable of explaining the solidity of bodies, it must have unity and divisibility on the one hand and physical reality on the other. Gassendi cleverly traces the history of human thought in such a manner as to make atomism appear as the simplest and best solution of a problem, the earlier answers to which were less satisfactory and more complex. In his description of the properties of the atom he follows Epicurus, but he denies that it is eternal or unproduced. By making it dependent upon God for its creation, but preserving its independence in action, he safeguards the interests of both science and theology. A crucial point in the system is the explanation of qualities as due to various combinations of atoms that differ only in magnitude, figure, and weight, and in the order and position of their arrangement. Somehow or other the qualitative distinctions known through the senses are correlated with these simple properties, but no attempt is made to reduce the one to terms of the other.

In his treatment of animate nature, Gassendi, true to philosophical tradition, distinguishes between the Anima and the Animus, and assigns the different aspects of consciousness to one or the other, as if they were entirely different entities. Sensation and perception belong to the Anima, and are treated from the mechanical standpoint. Imagination or phantasy is a function of the Animus, and is dependent upon the condition of the brain, which has been modified by preceding sensations. "The direct material of thought is purely symbolic of the external reality; only the disposition of the brain itself remains to testify to the action of an object on the senses, and all the substantial nature of things is reduced to a mode of motion of the brain-substance, out of which we may build again an unsubstantial pageant of reflection" (pp. 133–134). Wax as a simile is expressly rejected, and the whole treatment is a remarkable anticipation of later work in psychology.

The mind or intellect cannot be explained in the same manner as phantasy. It must be viewed as a distinct entity, requiring a new creation to account for its origin, otherwise its immortality could not

be established. Yet it is united with the body; and, as Gassendi is acute enough to see, the very fact of their union proves the two elements to be not wholly antagonistic. He insists that they must be regarded as adapted to each other; yet since the terms used represent absolute differences, mind and body are continually appearing under the guise of distinct realities.

The task of discovering Gassendi's views on ethics is described as one of considerable difficulty, not only on account of the enormous mass of quotations and the frequent repetitions, but also because of the obscurity caused by the double purpose of defending and modifying the doctrines of Epicurus. Gassendi pronounces the end of life to be pleasure, yet the pleasure must be that which would seem preferable to the good man, something that can be called moral apart from its pleasure-giving qualities. Brett considers this description of the *summum bonum* as a good apology for Epicurus but as a weakness on the part of Gassendi. "Mere transference of an ideal from one age to another must necessarily be weak and shallow: it implies an abstract attitude of mind refusing to face the new conditions and new problems that time unfolds" (p. 194). The principle is undoubtedly sound, though there might be a difference of opinion as to whether Gassendi's procedure may properly be called the "mere transference of an ideal from one age to another"; but however this may be, if the criticism is applicable to his ethics, is it not equally so to his physics? Is not his method the same in both cases? It is true that the results reached are not of like value, but the advantages of his physical doctrines are chiefly due to his master, while his own modifications, apparently introduced with a view to reconciling atomism with Christianity, are less consistent with the original body of teachings than are the changes made in the Epicurean ethics.

The treatment of the virtues offers nothing especially distinctive, but seems to be equally prolix and edifying. Brett argues at some length against the contention of Thomas (*La Philosophie de Gassendi*) that Gassendi arrives at an idea of universal law comparable to that of Kant, and succeeds in showing that Gassendi's universality is of the strictly legal type, and that his ethics never oversteps the bounds of the ideal set by prudence. With regard to the nature and attributes of God he is in direct opposition to Epicurus. He treats the question as one of causality and regards God as the first cause, as the creator of the atoms. The metaphysical presuppositions of his system justify him in doing so, and the assumption of the existence of God is not to be considered as a mere arbitrary appendage to his

philosophy, added for the sake of conformity to Church doctrines, but as an integral part of the system.

In spite of the closeness with which Brett holds himself to the matter in hand in his summary, and his evident intention to separate, so far as may be, exposition from evaluation, the reader comes to the last part of the book with his mind pretty well made up as to his author's opinion of Gassendi. The final discussion serves, however, to clarify and systematize these general impressions, and also supplies us with a comparison between this and other modern forms of atomism. In the revival of ancient, especially pre-Aristotelian systems that marked the beginning of modern philosophy, Gassendi was the first to attempt a systematic reconstruction of atomism. He did so, however, at a time when subjectivism was rapidly gaining ground, and thus the very objectivity of his thinking was a cause of the neglect accorded to him, a neglect which was increased by the opprobrium attached to the name of Epicurus. Yet his writings are not so alien to us to-day as we might expect to find them, and Gassendi may with justice be compared to Herbert Spencer. Each tried to write the synthetic philosophy of his age; and their likenesses and their differences show how much has been done since Gassendi's time and also how many problems remain the same. To call the system produced by Gassendi materialism, as Ueberweg and Lange do, is to overlook some of its essential characteristics, or else to use the term materialism in another than the accepted sense. Since Gassendi does not make mind a function of matter, he cannot properly be designated a materialist. Neither is he an idealist, either of the Cartesian or of the transcendental type. His combination of the atomistic theory of the world with a non-materialistic view of the mind may best be termed an empirical realism, which means that "our ground is experience, and our world is real in the anti-idealistic sense that it is not made by mind" (p. 256).

The principle employed in the working out of this philosophy is that of an ascending series of complexities. "The unit is the atom; things are complexes of atoms; and each degree of complexity has its own peculiar attributes" (*loc. cit.*). Besides the atomic scale we have, as irreducible realities, time and space, the mind and God. In a certain sense this is a pluralism, yet the collection of irreducibles must be regarded as a unity, just because it holds together and as a matter of fact is one, as soon as the philosopher ceases to meddle with it. That such a position is crude is apparent, that it is not merely so becomes clear from the treatment accorded by Gassendi to motion, the categories, and the relation of quality to quantity. In passing

upward in the scale of being we find constant breaks, which must be recognized; and the disparity between matter and mind is only an extreme case of differences everywhere present. Gassendi does not attempt to compromise between mind and matter; and, while emphasizing the value of the mechanical view, he sees its limitations, and recognizes the existence of quality as well as quantity. Yet his philosophy cannot escape the vices attached to its good points, and the very fact that mind and matter remain equally objective makes a final unity impossible.

The concluding chapter is largely concerned with a comparison of Gassendi with Leibniz and Lotze, and does not contribute much to an understanding of Gassendi himself. In fact I think the book would be improved by omitting the final chapter, which weakens the impression left by the preceding ones. With this exception it would be difficult to find fault with the book. It is a well-written account of a philosophy of which we have hitherto known but little, and displays an admirable union of enthusiastic interest and temperate judgment. When the author differs from other critics of Gassendi, he in most cases succeeds in proving his side of the question at issue. He is disposed perhaps to credit Gassendi with rather more originality than is his due, and possibly to overestimate his importance as an independent thinker. Lange's view of him as a materialist who out of regard for theology admitted inconsistent elements into his system, is not altogether without foundation, though I think Brett has succeeded in disproving this in Lange's extreme form. Perhaps we shall not be far wrong if we regard the term materialism as less applicable to Gassendi's philosophy than Lange supposed but as a more adequate description of it than Brett is inclined to admit.

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